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Heidegger’s philosophy is difficult because he wanted it to be. Or, more 
precisely, he wanted it to become, to be continually in the process of becoming true, 
and therefore to be forever incomplete. His philosophy is difficult because its meaning is 
always in process. What he opposed most of all was definitiveness and finality, because 
his search was for truth and reality as it is becoming true and real. “Wege – nichts 
Werke [ways – not works]” was the slogan that he attached to his collected opus.1 His 
philosophy is always on the way; it is never a finished work. 
To try to understand Heidegger definitively, therefore, is to work against his 
purpose. Instead of merely understanding him, I will argue, we must try to imagine the 
experience that he was seeking. Heidegger’s philosophy is experiential rather than 
merely conceptual. Concepts are determinate patterns of thought; what he sought was 
more primordial. The experience of reality-as-becoming-real must be felt rather than 
merely understood because it involves the activity of Being by which truths become 
true.2 Heidegger’s Being cannot be conceptualized because it is prior to any fixed reality 
or given truth. Not only do conceptualizations fail to capture the experience of Being, as 
                                            
1
 Martin Heidegger, Frühe Schriften, Gesamtausgabe Band 1 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), 437. 
2
 “We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough. We view action only as causing 
an effect…. Thinking, in contrast, lets itself be claimed by being so that it can say the truth of being. 
Thinking accomplishes this letting.” Martin Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in 
Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 239.  
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determinate representations, they get in the way of that experience. Heidegger wanted 
us to break down our accepted conceptualizations of reality in order to make an opening 
within ourselves for the unmediated experience of Being as the becoming of truth. 
My argument in this chapter is ad hominem, which need not mean that is 
fallacious. Ad hominem arguments are fallacies when they seek to undermine the 
coherence of an idea or set of ideas by irrelevantly criticizing the person who holds it. 
By contrast, my argument seeks to clarify Heidegger’s ideas by describing the relevant 
feelings with which they are arguably associated. I will suggest moreover that those 
feelings are shared by many members of Western modernity, which is why Heidegger’s 
philosophy is popular despite its inscrutability.  
As a contribution to the wider project of the redemption of feelings as proper 
objects of study, my goal is to describe the affective power of this notoriously difficult 
thinker as a way to find his meaning. Heidegger gives us no choice but to try to feel 
what he means, because he does not want to be merely understood. “To make itself 
understandable is suicide for philosophy,” he at one point tells us.3 His obscurity is 
meant to challenge our belief in fixed realities, such as the “facts” of scientific thinking, 
so that we can instead experience the feeling of the real as it becomes real. 
The German word Erfahrung means “experience.” In Heidegger’s later writing, he 
used it often, much more often than Verstehen or “understanding.” For example, in the 
Beiträge zur Philosophie [Contributions to Philosophy; hereafter BP for the German and 
                                            
3
 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela 
Vallega-Neu (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012), 344. In all quotations in 
which it appears, I have replaced the translators’ “beying” with the original “Seyn.” 
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CP for the English; all emphases in original],4 the former word and its derivatives appear 
perhaps 20 times in the first 50 pages, almost always in significant contexts, while 
derivatives of the latter appear perhaps half as often and almost always in trivial 
contexts. What Heidegger sought was not an understanding or mere knowledge but a 
special kind of inner experience, which is the feeling of existence as the coming-to-be of 
newness within oneself. Below, I will call this feeling post-Lutheran. In Heidegger’s 
specific case, he sought the experience of philosophical origination as one who 
participates in the inception of a new way of thinking. In the Contributions, the work to 
which I will most often turn, he often called it “er-denken” (BP 3, 56-57, 73 et passim), 
which a literalist could translate as “ur-thinking.” 
Heidegger’s favorite words have connotations that typically go beyond their 
ordinary meaning. Perhaps his most favorite word is ursprünglich, which as an adjective 
means “original” but which many of his translators, seeking to capture his special sense, 
render as “originary.” The prefix, “ur-,” with which English speakers are familiar, means 
“out of, originally, in the beginning.”5 “Sprung” simply means “jump” or “spring,” so 
“ursprünglich,” if we read it with etymological literalness, refers to something that 
“springs forth from the origin.” In some of his writings from the same period as the 
Contributions, Heidegger added a hyphen, for example writing “Ur-sprung” for “origin,” 
to emphasize the sense of self-origination or self-grounding.6 Hence “ursprünglich” and 
its variants in Heidegger’s special usage have the connotation of existential origination. 
                                            
4
 Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Gesamtausgabe Band 65 (Frankfurt: 
Klostermann, [1936-38] 1989); Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy. 
5
 Friedrich Kluge, An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language, trans. John Francis Davis 
(London: G. Bell & Sons, 1891), s.v. “ur-.” 
6
 For example, Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 2
nd
 ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1958), 
8. The context provides the idea of self-origination as self-grounding. In English, Martin Heidegger, 
Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2000), 6-7. 
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The goal of his philosophy is to experience that which is ur-sprünglich. His Erfahrung is 
the feeling of coming into existence. 
The “er-”of “Erfahrung” is an etymological variant of the “ur-”of “ursprünglich.”7 In 
the Contributions, Heidegger again sometimes used the device of hyphenation to 
emphasize the connotation of pure origination, writing “er-fahren”, “er-fährt” and 
“Er-fahrung” (BP 160, 391, 483). “Fahren” means “to drive” or “to move,” so Heidegger’s 
“Er-fahren” and its variants, when hyphenated in this emphatic way, explicitly connote 
the feeling of being moved by the power of origination. With this device, Heidegger 
makes it clear that his Er-fahrung is the feeling of the Ur-sprung of new existence. But 
even when he used the unhyphenated “Erfahrung” in more ordinary ways, as he often 
did, it was never mere Verstehen that he sought. 
For a thinker who always focussed on the question of Being, origination means 
existential newness, which is the coming of something into existence from nothingness. 
Hence Heidegger’s Erfahrung is the feeling of being created ex nihilo; it is the feeling of 
actively experiencing that kind of godly power. In the history of the early modern West, 
that idea and that feeling can be traced to the affective teachings of Martin Luther. I will 
argue that all Westerners can imagine the inner feeling of self-existence as the spiritual 
power of creative newness within ourselves, because we have learned that idea and 
that feeling from our culture. 
 
The Post-Lutheran Feeling of Existence 
Luther’s famous inward turn can be traced to Augustine, and before him perhaps 
to the Greek idea of entheos or “God within,” but what Luther sought to feel as an inner 
                                            
7
 Kluge, Etymological Dictionary of German, s.v. “er-.” 
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presence had nothing to do with Greek eternalism. Luther’s God is the power of new 
existence, the very power of creation ex nihilo. For such a God, there are no eternal 
truths in the world because everything comes into existence as an utter newness from 
him. The post-Lutheran enthusiasm, notwithstanding its etymological relation to 
“entheos,” is the inner feeling of existential newness, which did not belong to the 
Greeks. 
The early Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo was developed in part as an 
explicit refutation of the eternalist ontologies of the Greeks.8 From the beginning, creatio 
ex nihilo was not just about the creation of matter out of nothing but also about the utter 
newness of the forms that God created to shape the world. According to the doctrine as 
it matured into the medieval centuries, God’s existential power is prior to every worldly 
essence; this idea is the model of Sartre’s famous slogan, as he perhaps understood.9 
What his existentialism sought to capture is the idea that human self-existence is an 
ontological power that is prior the created patterns of reality, but this is a post-Christian 
conceptualization in which the human self replaces God as the free maker of reality. 
Hence Sartre’s existentialism is derivative: Christians much earlier had seen their God 
                                            
8
 According to a comprehensive study of origins of the doctrine by Gerhard May: 
Not before the middle of the second century was the debate with [Greek] philosophy recognised 
as the central task of Christian thinking and tackled as such…. How to reconcile the idea of the 
God who creates feely and unconditionally with the concepts of Greek metaphysics now 
becomes a central theme of Christian theology. This group of questions forms, alongside the 
gnostic problem, the second focal point of the controversy over ideas of creation which took 
place in the second century. It was within the scope of the questions thus raised that the 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo was developed. 
Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of "Creation out of Nothing" in Early Christian Thought, 
trans. A.S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 1-2. 
9
 “Atheistic existentialism … states that if God does not exist, there is at least one being in whom 
existence precedes essence…. That being is man, or, as Heidegger put it, the human reality.” Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2007), 22. 
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as the pure power of existence. He is personified as a loving father but his power is 
ultimately existential. 
The idea of a purely existential God was reinforced for Christians by the 
influential Muslim philosopher, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), near the beginning of the second 
millennium. He famously argued that for everything other than God, the issue of 
whether it exists is a different kind of question than what kind of thing it is. Hence 
existence and essence are to be distinguished for all worldly things. But for God, his 
essence just is his existence. (In Being and Time, Heidegger plays with the same 
langauge with reference to human Dasein.)10 This means that God just is the power of 
existence. This God is the first and final existentialist. For later Christians, to feel the 
power of that God within themselves is to experience the inner power of existence. 
Again, this is not existence understood as Greek eternalism but as Christian 
creationism: it is the world-making power of creation ex nihilo. The inner presence of 
that power is the self-feeling that Luther taught his followers to look for within 
themselves. 
Luther was a pessimistic moralist who believed in the doctrine of original sin, but 
he also believed that God with perfect freedom had chosen some for the unmerited gift 
of salvation. How then to know whether one had been saved? Good works were 
inconsequential at best, and at worst could be seen as the prideful attempt to influence 
God. Those who are justified do good works, but justification is the cause, not the effect. 
Luther’s doctrine of salvation was captured in the slogan, “sola fide”: those who are 
                                            
10
 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 11
th
 edn. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967), 42-43; Martin Heidegger, 
Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 67-68. See 
also Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism,” 248. 
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saved from eternal damnation are justified by “faith alone.” To have true faith is to be 
reborn as justified, not by one’s own power but solely by the power of God. 
In his controversy with Erasmus over the question of human freedom, Luther 
denied that humans have fee will in anything other than inconsequential matters. In one 
of the most evocative images in his Bondage of the Will, he wrote that we are like an 
animal that will be ridden by God or by Satan, but that does not even have the power to 
choose between them.11 But Luther’s desire to efface the human will had a perverse 
historical effect: believers learned to feel godly inside, precisely because they learned to 
open themselves to that feeling by obviating their own willfulness. And because the 
experience of inner godliness was the essential sign of salvation from eternal hellfire, 
feelings of enthusiasm – the feeling of entheos, Christianized as an existential power – 
became endemic. Eventually, many Western modernists came to feel, more than know, 
that they instead of God are the ultimate creators of reality. 
Creativity, if the word means more than cleverness at discovering realities that 
already exist, is about bringing something into existence from non-existence. The newly 
created thing need not be a new kind of matter but something about its form or structure 
must be, in some non-trivial way, unlike anything that already exists. If not, it is a copy 
rather than a creation. Creativity, therefore, even in something like a new song, poem or 
other work of art, is always about creation ex nihilo. It is a newness of pattern, which 
must be non-trivially unlike anything that has already existed. Its creator must bring it 
into existence from non-existence; this is creation ex nihilo exactly. Human creators 
need not create the whole universe anew every time, nor do they create the material 
                                            
11
 Martin Luther, On the Bondage of the Will, trans. Henry Cole (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1823), 
69. 
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upon which they work, but the newness of each particular creation is always an 
existential newness. It must include a newness of pattern that did not exist prior to its 
creation. To bring something into being from nothingness is, with straightforward 
literalness, always an act of creation ex nihilo. 
When we say that someone is creative, or that some work of art powerfully 
evokes the creativity of the artist, we are making a kind of spiritual claim that something 
higher than ordinary scientific causality is involved. My suggestion is that most Western 
readers can easily feel the spiritualistic associations that the idea of creativity arouses, 
though some will feel it more strongly than others. To say that someone is creative is to 
suggest that he or she has a power over and above ordinary reality, because it is the 
power to bring new things into that reality. In the West, this power was originally thought 
to belong only to God. Today, we in the West have been enculturated to believe in 
human creativity, not just an idea, but as a positive value with associated affects that 
are also strongly positive. For us, the experience of creativity in a work of art, for 
example, is affective and not just conceptual. It moves us in more than just our ideas; it 
is an Er-fahrung. All of us can experience the power of creativity as a post-Lutheran 
inner feeling. What Luther taught his followers to feel remains with us, though many of 
us in modernity experience it as desacralized and anthropocentric. Heidegger sought 
the same feeling of inner newness, except that he wanted to experience it as the 
coming-to-be of an entirely new way of thinking about everything. 
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The “Ur-Trembling” of Being in the Contributions to Philosophy 
The Contributions began as set of private writings from 1936-38 that were not 
initially intended for publication and that appeared in German as part of Heidegger’s 
Gesamtausgabe only in 1989. As such, they offer a special look into the thoughts, but 
also the underlying feelings, of the man. My suggestion is that as a believer in the 
existential power of creativity, he wanted above all to be original, and therefore resisted 
the recognition that creativity is an unoriginal belief. Moreover, because the idea of 
existential newness or newness from nothingness resists conceptualization, 
Heidegger’s belief in creativity operated at an affective rather than at a conceptual level. 
He knew that any attempt to conceptualize the power of creative newness would get in 
the way of the experience he was seeking, so he actively resisted conceptual clarity 
about his own feelings. But for these reasons, and because creationism is in itself a 
deeply emotional belief, Heidegger failed to attain a critical distance from the affects 
that, I contend, underlie and drive his philosophy. 
At the overt philosophical level, Heidegger’s creationism is careful and subtle. He 
did not merely idolize newness for its own sake (CP 45; see also Being and Time, 397-
99). He tells us that “the new is not the ‘modern,’ namely, that which is currently in 
vogue.... Instead, the new refers here to the freshness of the originariness of re-
beginning [der Ursprünglichkeit des wieder Anfangens], that which ventures out into the 
concealed future of the first beginning and thus cannot at all be ‘new’ but must be even 
older than the old” (CP 343, BP 434).  
He also rejected the idea of a creative subject, either godly or human, as the 
source of creative newness, because every subject is an already-extant being. 
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Subjectivity cannot be the ultimate source of newness because the subject must exist 
as a being before it can produce anything. Heidegger wanted to experience Being as an 
activity in itself, as the origin or Ur-sprung of every being including every subject. He 
sought the experience of creativity without any given creator. 
Heidegger understood that newness must come to a putative creator before it 
can come from him or her. His philosophy of questioning is about opening ourselves to 
the experience of the event of newness by subverting or obviating our unquestioning 
acceptance of what already exists. But the teaching is not new: open yourself to the 
inner experience of God’s existential power by repudiating your own will, said Luther. 
Heidegger rejected Luther’s God because he wanted the experience of newness 
without a higher being, especially an eternal one. He wanted to experience Being as 
prior to any being. 
In my opening paragraph, I claimed that Heidegger sought to know truth as it is 
becoming true and reality as it is becoming real. Here is how he described it in the 
Contributions: “Truth never ‘is’; instead, it essentially occurs. [Die Wahrheit »ist« nie, 
sondern west.] ... Thus what essentially occurs is also everything that belongs to truth, 
including time-space and consequently ‘space’ and ‘time’” (CP 271, BP 342). And again: 
“Inasmuch as truth essentially occurs, comes to be, the event becomes truth. The event 
eventuates [Das Ereignis ereignet], which means nothing else but that it and only it 
becomes truth” (CP 276, PB 349; as always here, the emphases are his).  
Hence the “event” of the books subtitle, “Vom Ereignis” (the prefix is again 
sometimes set off by one of Heidegger’s hyphens, for example on the first page), refers 
to truth and reality as they come into being. It also has the suggestion of “coming into 
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one’s own,” so the subtitle in full means this: we come authentically into our own only 
when we experience the coming-into-being of truth and reality.  
Creationism is exnihilism. To create is always to bring something new into 
existence from nothingness; existential newness is newness ex nihilo. Creationists need 
nothingness as the origin of existential newness. Heidegger understood this better than 
most. In his inaugural lecture of 1929, published as Was ist Metaphysik?, as well as in 
other works including the Contributions, Heidegger repeatedly objected to the idea that 
nothingness is merely the opposite of somethingness.12 The problem with that view is 
that it takes beings as primary or as given, and then defines nothingness as their mere 
negation. For creationists, this will not do, because for them, nothingness is first. For 
Heidegger, nothingness is powerfully primordial: “Only if we have liberated ourselves 
from misinterpreting nothingness on the basis of beings ... thus degrading ‘nothingness’ 
to a mere denial of the determinateness and mediation of beings, as did Hegel and all 
metaphysicians before him, only then will we surmise what power of steadfastness 
rushes into the human being” as Being is experienced (CP 380).  
Nothingness is the “abyssal ground” of everything creative, though it is 
accessible only to the special few: 
It is always only a few who arrive at the leap [Sprung], and they do so on 
different paths. By creating and sacrificing, they always are the ones who 
belong to the grounding of Da-sein in the time-space of which beings as beings 
are preserved and thereby the truth of Seyn is sheltered. But Seyn is ever in 
extreme concealment and is transport into the incalculable and unique, at the 
sharpest and highest crest which both constitutes what is along the abyssal 
                                            
12
 Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik? (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1931). 
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ground of nothingness [dem Ab-grund des Nichts] and itself grounds the abyss. 
(CP 186, BP 236) 
Nothingness, Heidegger tells us repeatedly in the Contributions, is not the 
opposite of Being or Seyn but belongs intimately to it. For example: “Or is it precisely 
not from beings that one gains an intimation of Seyn but, rather, from that which alone is 
of equal rank with Seyn, as constantly appertaining to Seyn, namely, from 
nothingness?” (CP 193; see also 80, 325, 378). To overcome the faulty metaphysics 
that puts beings before nothingness, we must “determine the belonging together of 
Seyn and nothingness more originarily” (CP 194; see also 380). By doing so we may 
come to see nothingness as a kind of creative power: “Indeed, is it not primarily on 
account of this negativity of Seyn itself that ‘nothingness’ is full of that assigning ‘power,’ 
the enduring of which is the origin of all ‘creating’ (beings coming to be more fully)?” (CP 
194). 
According to Heidegger, “Nothingness ... is more than any being” (CP 209).To 
explain this surprising claim, he uses one of the recurrent tropes of the Contributions, 
which is that of an exnihilistic quivering or “ur-trembling [Erzitterung].” The quotation 
above in full: “Nothingness is neither negative nor a ‘goal.’ Instead, it is the essential 
trembling [die wesentliche Erzitterung] of Seyn itself and therefore is more than any 
being” (CP 209, BP 266). Seyn “trembles” with existential power, which is provided by 
nothingness as the prior opposite of somethingness. In short, Heidegger’s Being 
vibrates or trembles with the creative tension between nothingness and somethingness, 
but always with nothingness as the first partner. His “Erzitterung” or “ur-trembling” is the 
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vibratory power of somethingness from nothingness. It is the power of creation ex nihilo, 
imagined as the existential trembling of Seyn. 
The post-religious belief in the idea of nothingness as the origin of creative 
newness explains why those who are drawn to existentialism are also drawn to the idea 
of death; for example, that “death [is] the highest testimony to Seyn” (CP 181; see also 
222 ff.). To imagine our own nothingness is to be awakened to our own livingness, 
understood not as a fact about ourselves but as the “transformative” activity of coming-
to-be (e.g. CP 256-57). To speak of death in Heideggerian is to be ek-cited about 
ek-sistence. Existentialists (I include Heidegger, notwithstanding his desire to be sui 
generis) are fascinated by nothingness, including the thought of their own death, 
because they love the feeling of life as existence ex nihilo. But nothingness is difficult to 
comprehend or explain, except as the opposite of a prior somethingness. To believe 
instead in nothingness as the prior origin of everything is to believe in an inexplicability; 
hence it is more easily felt than comprehended. Here again, the post-Christian belief in 
exnihilism is manifested more easily as a feeling than as an understanding. 
In some of his usages, Heidegger’s Erzitterung is plainly evocative of the feeling 
of becoming godly: “Seyn is the ur-trembling of divinization [Das Seyn ist die Erzitterung 
des Götterns]” (CP 189, translation modified; BP 239). He does not mean that the gods, 
as already existing beings, have this power, but that the process of becoming godly, 
even for the gods, is the trembling of exnihilation. Soon thereafter he repeats the phrase 
but adds the emphatic hyphen, “Er-zitterung des Götterns” (BP 240); now it is explicitly 
an existential “ur-trembling” and not a mere tremulousness. Elsewhere he connects this 
“ur-trembling” to the idea of nothingness using one of his favorite tropes for the latter, 
DeWiel 14 
 
the “abyssal fissure,” while drawing further links to the idea of intimacy or inwardness: 
“The intimacy of this trembling requires the most abyssal fissure [Die Innigkeit dieser 
Erzittern bedarf der abgründigen Zerklüftung]” (CP 193, BP 244). To inwardly 
experience the exnihilistic force of this ur-trembling, we must approach the abyss of 
nothingness. 
Another of Heidegger’s portentous ur-words is “Erschwingung,” which means 
“vibration” or “oscillation,” though to capture his special meaning I would offer 
“ur-vibration.” Often he strings such words together with other laden phrases; for 
example, “Das Erzittern [ur-trembling] dieser Erschwingung [ur-vibration] in der Kehre 
[turning] des Ereignisses [ur-event] ist das verborgenste Wesen [most hidden essence] 
des Seyns” (BP 262).  
Describing his coinage, “Wesung (essencing or coming to essence),” a gerund 
based on his transformation of “Wesen (essence)” into an active verb, Heidegger writes, 
“Wesung is not supposed to name something that lies beyond Seyn; instead, it utters 
what is innermost [Innerstes] to Seyn, namely, the ur-event [Er-eignis], that counter-
swing [Gegenschwung] between Seyn and Da-sein in which the two are not objectively 
present poles but are the pure coming to be of the ur-vibration [Erschwingung] itself (CP 
225, translation modified; BP 286-87). Here again a number of key themes are 
connected: that “essencing” is the activity by which essences come into existence; that 
the activity of “essencing” is innermost to Seyn; that the relation of Dasein to Seyn is 
analogous to the ur-vibration within Seyn; and finally that this ur-vibration is a “pure 
coming to be.”  
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To recognize that Heidegger’s philosophy is driven by the search for the inner 
experience of exnihilism is to clarify a number of his key themes and locutions. Why 
was he so fascinated by nothingness? It is because, for creationists, the nihil is prior to 
creatio. What could an “abgrund (abyssal ground)” possibly be? It is the nothingness 
that is the origin of somethingness. What is a “fissure” or “abyssal fissure”? It is an 
existential opening, i.e. a nothingness, into which and/or from which existential newness 
can come. Why are there so many emphatic “ur-” and “er-” words in his writing? See 
above. Why does he so often write about Being in terms of “Streit (strife),” “Kampf 
(struggle),” “Auseinandersetzung (confrontation)” and “polemos (Greek for war)”? (CP 
and elsewhere, passim)? Because the inner essence of Seyn is the creative tension 
between nothingness and somethingness. Why must our Dasein be “historical”? 
Because to be so is to participate in the becoming of truth and reality. Why does he turn 
nouns such as “Welt (world)” and “Wesen (essence)” into active verbs, “weltet” and 
“west”? They are devices to bring us into the experience of reality as becoming real. 
Why did he so dislike scientific and technological thinking? Because they seek definitive 
understandings of unmagical processes. Why was he so antagonistic to Platonism and 
Aristotelianism? Because their ontologies exclude the possibility of creative newness. 
Why did he so dislike Christianity? Because he wanted a newer god. Finally, why did he 
support the chauvinistic volkishness of the Nazis? Because he thought lesser peoples 
were calculative and imitative, while only the Germans were creative and spiritual.13 
                                            
13
 For Heidegger’s views of the Jews during the 1930s, which are becoming clearer with the publication of 
the “Black Notebooks,” see for example Gregory Fried, “What Heidegger Was Hiding: Unearthing the 
Philosopher’s Anti-Semitism,” Foreign Affairs, 93:6 (Nov./Dec. 2014), 159-166. For his belief that only the 
Germans were truly creative and spiritual, see for example the Introduction to Metaphysics, 40-41. 
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It may be ad hominem, with regard to both the writer and his enthusiasts, to 
examine the feelings that Heidegger’s writing evokes. But only by identifying the 
experience that he sought can we find, by abduction, a coherent hypothesis that 
explains all the themes above at once. For all his brilliance and insight, Heidegger never 
escaped his enculturated feelings. But if we want to know ourselves, we must examine 
our feelings and sometimes admit of their origin as an unexamined inheritance from our 
culture. Some feelings may be natural but others, like the inner feeling of creativity, 
must be cultural because not every culture (for example, the ancient Greeks) knew 
those feelings. 
 
Modern Creationism and Its Alternative 
All of us in the post-Lutheran West, I contend, can recognize the special feeling 
that the idea of creativity arouses within ourselves. It is an affective idea because 
somethingness-from-nothingness does not occur in the natural world, so the notion is 
suggestive of a higher spirituality. (For simplicity here I omit those philosophies in which 
nature or reality itself is seen as a process of Becoming. These philosophies, such as 
those of Bergson or Whitehead, in my view demonstrate how pervasive and manifold 
creationism is within our largely post-Christian culture.) Creativity has spiritualistic or 
quasi-religious connotations precisely because it is a self-belief that emerged from 
religion. Human creativity is a post-Christian belief that developed in the West from the 
teaching that God is creativity and that humans were created in his image and likeness. 
We become human, according to this religious story, when we receive a spark of God’s 
essence (think of Michelangelo’s David) which allows us to be creative. Within Christian 
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history, this message was mostly latent (except for recurrent outbreaks of Pelagianism) 
because of the dominance of other teachings, such as that of original sin. But eventually 
in Western modernity, the belief emerged that humans, often now instead of God, are 
the creators of reality. 
While every imaginative modernist in the West, I suggest, can imagine the inner 
feeling of creativity that our culture has taught us, and some of us feel it very strongly. 
Heidegger’s philosophy reinforced rather than challenged his inherited feelings, 
because both were about the desire to be original. But creativity is a borrowed idea and 
the feeling of desire for it is a modern Western peculiarity. In the West today, creativity 
has become a cliché. 
Heidegger’s enduring value is in helping us question our clichés of thought, but in 
the case of creativity, he failed to know himself. Creativity cannot be the antidote to the 
thoughtless acceptance of inherited paradigms, because it is such a paradigm. That is, 
it is an enculturated pattern of thought that pre-structures our experience of reality in 
ways that we ordinarily do not notice. The belief in human creativity is an affective 
thought-structure inherited from religion. The Bible, especially as interpreted by 
Christians, tells us that truth and reality are created by God. Then Luther taught us to 
feel that power within ourselves. Now we feel it as our own power. But those who 
believe it most fully are neither creative nor self-creative, because they have copied 
their central idea of themselves. The belief in human creativity is belied by the historical 
fact that the very idea of creativity is unoriginal. 
But if we want to do more than robotically accept our culture’s programming, 
what is the alternative if it is not to be more creative? My own preference is to go back 
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to the pre-Christian philosophy of the Greeks, not as Heidegger creatively understood 
them as “primordial” and “historical,” but as early searchers for the differences between 
better and worse understandings. If we wish to leave behind the post-Christian 
presumption that truth is what we say it is, we must first accept the possibility that we 
are the discoverers rather than the creators of reality. The question of whether truth and 
reality are ultimately created or discovered is a large one, but it cannot be answered by 
thoughtlessly accepting the post-Christian belief that we are the ultimate truthmakers, 
even if it feels good to think so. 
 
 
